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1 Introduction
As a species, we humans are characterized by the per-
vasiveness and flexibility with which we cooperate. In 
attempting to account for this hallmark of human sociality, 
comparative and developmental psychologists have increas-
ingly become interested in the emergence in infancy and 
early childhood of prosocial behavior, i.e. of ‘behaviors 
benefiting another person without providing the helper an 
immediate payoff’ (Paulus 2014). In particular, it has been 
observed that infants as early as the second year of life 
comfort others who are in distress (Bischof-Köhler 1988, 
1991; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992; Dunfield et al. 2011; Dun-
field and Kuhlmeier 2013; Vaish et  al. 2009), share food 
and other resources (Hay et  al. 1991; Levitt et  al. 1985), 
point to provide others with information (Liszkowski et al. 
2007), and spontaneously help others to achieve their goals 
(Warneken and Tomasello 2006; Svetlova et  al. 2010; 
Hepach et  al. 2012, 2016, 2017). Given that these behav-
iors are exhibited prior to extensive enculturation, they 
may reflect the operation of phylogenetically ancient psy-
chological mechanisms underpinning human cooperation 
(Warneken and Tomasello 2009). Explaining the mecha-
nisms underpinning these behaviors may therefore shed 
light on how human cooperation emerged in evolution and 
what basic psychological mechanisms sustain it today.
While it may be tempting to seek a single explanation 
that covers all of the aforementioned varieties of prosocial-
ity in infancy, we should be wary of assuming that this will 
be possible, especially in light of recent research indicating 
that these types of behaviors exhibit ‘dissociable develop-
mental trajectories and distinct associations with individual 
difference factors early in life’ (Dunfield 2014: 1). In the 
following, therefore, we will limit our focus to one variety 
of infant prosociality, namely spontaneous instrumental 
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helping (Warneken and Tomasello 2006, 2007; Warneken 
et al. 2007; Cf.; Svetlova et al. 2010; Dunfield 2014).
While many different scenarios have been used in instru-
mental helping paradigms, they share the same basic struc-
ture: an agent is unable to achieve her goal because there 
is some obstacle or because an object is out of her reach. 
In one scenario, for example, an agent who wants to write 
a letter attempts to grasp a pencil which is out of her/his 
reach, but which is within reach of the infant participant. As 
Warneken and Tomasello (2007) have demonstrated, even 
14-month-olds will typically grasp the pencil and hand it 
over to the agent. In a different scenario, 18-month-olds 
observing an agent who is unable to place a stack of books 
into a cabinet when the cabinet door falls shut (the agent’s 
arms are full of books) will typically jump up, walk over, 
and open the cabinet door to help the agent (Warneken and 
Tomasello 2006). In a third scenario, a book slides off of a 
stack as the agent attempts to place it on top of the stack; 
the 18-month-olds pick up the book and return it to the top 
of the stack (Warneken and Tomasello 2006).
What leads children to perform these actions? We will 
begin (Sect. 2) with a brief overview of models that have 
been proposed to account for this, and refer to specific stud-
ies which either support or fail to support each model. Next 
(Sect. 3), we turn to our primary project, which is to illu-
minate a specific subset of models that have been proposed 
to account for spontaneous instrumental helping—namely 
models based upon ‘goal alignment’ (Paulus 2014). The 
core idea behind goal alignment models that the identifi-
cation of an agent’s goal leads infants to take up that goal 
as their own (Barresi and Moore 1996; Kenward and Gre-
debäck 2013; Paulus 2014; Köster et  al. 2015; Michael 
et al. 2016). Our main aim will be to distinguish between 
two separate goal-alignment models: ‘goal contagion’ and 
‘goal slippage’. As we shall see, these two models differ in 
how they specify the content of the goal which is identified 
and taken up. By elucidating this difference, we contribute 
to the articulation of experimental criteria for assessing 
whether and when the mechanisms specified by these two 
goal-alignment models are at work.
2  Modeling Instrumental Helping
2.1  Psychological Altruism
The first model to consider is the one originally proposed 
by Warneken and Tomasello (2006), namely that the kids 
in their studies are motivated by altruism. More specifi-
cally, what they have in mind is psychological altruism. 
Since they themselves do not use the qualifier ‘psychologi-
cal,’ it is worth taking a moment to explain why we do so. 
Doing so will also help to clarify the explanatory target of 
the models we will be considering.
In using the term ‘psychological altruism,’ we are 
appealing to the general distinction between the evolu-
tionary (ultimate) level of explanation and the psycho-
logical (proximate) level (Tinbergen 1963). In evolution-
ary biology, a behavior is considered altruistic if it raises 
the expected reproductive success of the recipient at the 
expense of the reproductive success of the agent perform-
ing it (Kitcher 1998). Altruism is puzzling from an evolu-
tionary perspective insofar as a disposition to act in a way 
that does not enhance the chances of one’s own genes to be 
propagated should be expected to disappear from a popula-
tion over time through natural selection (Axelrod and Ham-
ilton 1981; Axelrod 1984; Hamilton 1964, 1970; Smith 
1964, 1974). Much research in recent decades has accord-
ingly been devoted to identifying evolutionary explanations 
(i.e. ultimate mechanisms) that would support the selection 
of altruistic behavior—e.g. kin selection, direct (Trivers 
1971) and indirect (Nowak and Sigmund 1998) reciprocity, 
and the interdependency hypothesis (Roberts 2005; Toma-
sello 2016). Regardless of which of these ultimate mecha-
nisms turns out to be correct, though, there is still a further 
question as to what the psychological mechanisms are that 
actually motivate the altruistic behavior. After all, humans 
(and other animals) often engage in (at least apparently) 
altruistic behavior without explicitly reasoning about kin 
relations or any other evolutionary rationale. What are the 
psychological mechanisms that motivate them to do so?
One possibility is psychological altruism, i.e. for altru-
ism to feature as a proximate mechanism. What this means 
is that the agent’s goal in performing the behavior is to pro-
vide a benefit to the recipient (Foster et  al. 2006; Batson 
et  al. 2008), and that the recipient’s benefit must be per-
ceived as an end in itself, not as a means to the achievement 
of some other goals (Kitcher 1998) or to the attainment of 
an external reward (Piliavin and Charng 1990). According 
to a narrower definition, the benefit to the recipient must 
come at a cost to the agent (Grusec et al. 2002). This nar-
rower definition is more rigorous in that it can serve to rule 
out the possibility that the altruistic behavior is performed 
at least in part because its performance is intrinsically 
rewarding (i.e. this potential reward is offset by a cost).
Is this the case for infants in instrumental helping par-
adigms such as the ones referred to above? In support of 
this conjecture, Warneken et al. (2007) were able to show 
that rewarding the infants for helping did not increase their 
helping behavior at all (experiment 1), and also (experiment 
2) that 18-month olds were no less likely to help if it was 
made more costly for them (they had to get by an obstacle 
in order to do so, which is difficult for an 18-month-old). 
Building on this, Warneken and Tomasello (2008) reported 
the same pattern of findings when they raised the cost of 
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the helping behavior, i.e. the helping required the infants 
to resist the attractive option to play with interesting toys 
in a different part of the space. Carrying this logic further, 
Svetlova et  al. (2010) increased the cost still further by 
devising a scenario in which the child would have to (tem-
porarily) give up a cherished object brought from home 
(such as a favorite hairclip) in order to help. They found 
that 30-month-olds were still willing to help, albeit to a 
lesser extent than when the help was not costly; 18-month-
olds, in contrast, rarely helped in this condition. One other 
crucial finding from Warneken and Tomasello’s (2008) 
study was that children who had received a material reward 
for helping at one time-point were less likely to help at a 
later time point than children who had not been rewarded. 
As Warneken and Tomasello (2009) note: ‘this surprising 
finding provides even further evidence for the hypothesis 
that children’s helping is driven by an intrinsic rather than 
an extrinsic motivation. Rewards are often not only super-
fluous, but can have even detrimental effects as they can 
undermine children’s intrinsic altruistic motivation’ (460).
Impressive as these findings are, they are not decisive. 
With respect to the question of external rewards, Dahl 
(2015) was able to show that, while infants may not be 
rewarded in the lab for performing these behaviors, 11–25 
month-olds are commonly encouraged to help with similar 
activities at home and praised for doing so. Thus, it is pos-
sible that rewards form part of the developmental context in 
which instrumental helping emerges. There is also the issue 
of internal rewards—i.e. infants may experience a positive 
emotion as a result of helping and be motivated by this. 
In line with this prediction, Aknin et  al. (2012) reported 
that 22 month-olds exhibit greater happiness when giving 
rewards to others than when receiving the rewards them-
selves. Moreover, they were especially happy when engag-
ing in costly giving—i.e. forfeiting their own resources to 
give to others. The notion of internal rewards underscores a 
difficulty in evaluating the psychological altruism model: it 
is not clear how to distinguish between internal rewards that 
may be included as components within the altruism model 
and internal rewards which present alternatives to it. On the 
face of it, the suggestion that infants are motivated by the 
prospect of a positive emotion (‘warm glow’) appears to be 
an alternative to the suggestion that their motivation stems 
from a desire that the agent be helped. On the other hand, 
the psychological altruism model must surely include some 
specific account of how the altruistic desire to bring about 
the observed agent’s goal motivates the helping behavior. 
Could such an account appeal to the prospect of a warm 
glow as a motive? In order to decide this, and more gener-
ally to specify testable predictions derivable uniquely from 
psychological altruism model, it will be necessary to spell 
the model out in greater detail, and in particular to specify 
the motivational mechanisms that it includes.
2.2  A Preference for Joint Action
A further motivation for some forms of altruistic behavior 
is that it can be intrinsically pleasurable to engage in joint 
actions. Thus, young children who exhibit spontaneous 
instrumental helping behavior may do so at least in part 
because they like engaging in joint actions and are moti-
vated to do so (Rheingold et al. 1982; Svetlova et al. 2010; 
Paulus and Moore 20121), i.e. not because of any benefit 
that their contribution brings to anyone else.
One finding in the literature that provides support for 
this model is from a study by Barragan and Dweck (2014). 
This study was motivated by the thought that the ‘recipro-
cal play’ phase used in many studies to familiarize infants 
with the experimenter may prime a cooperative (joint 
action?) mindset. To test this, they contrasted a condition 
in which the experimenter engages in reciprocal play with 
the infant (rolling a ball back and forth) with a condition in 
which the experimenter and infant play in parallel next to 
each other. The main finding was that infants were signifi-
cantly more likely to help the experimenter after reciprocal 
play than after parallel play.
This model generates various testable predictions, some 
of which have indeed already been tested. First, it generates 
the prediction that infants will be less likely to help if doing 
so would not involve a joint action with the other agent. 
This prediction appears not to be supported by the results 
of a study by Hepach et al. (2016), in which it was shown 
that 18-month-olds were no less likely to help in a condi-
tion in which the other agent was absent during the perfor-
mance of the helping behavior. There are at least two ways 
in which this finding could be accommodated within the 
model however. First, the infants may experience the activ-
ity as a joint action even if the agent is temporarily not pre-
sent—especially if a joint action mindset has been primed 
in a prior familiarization phase (cf. Barragan and Dweck 
2014). Second, the finding does not rule out the possibil-
ity that a preference for joint action might provide a further 
motivation.
Another important study by Hepach et  al. (2012) also 
bears upon this model. In this study, 2 year-olds’ pupil dila-
tion was measured (as a proxy for arousal) at key moments 
during the experiment, for example when the agent was in 
distress as she dropped a crayon and was unable to reach 
it. The results showed that the children were aroused upon 
seeing the agent in distress, and then just as relieved to see 
that agent helped by some third party as they were when 
they helped the agent themselves. This suggests that, at 
least in these cases, they are motivated more strongly by the 
1 Moore and Paulus (2012) use the term ‘social interaction model’ to 
refer to much the same idea.
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desire that the agent be helped than by the desire to per-
form a joint action together with the agent. However, it is 
possible that this is because in the case of distress, the goal 
of relieving the agent’s distress is more salient than any 
other goal. Thus, it may in principle be helpful to apply a 
similar method to cases in which the agent is not in dis-
tress but is performing a mundane, everyday activity, such 
as putting books into a cabinet or reaching for a pencil—
although measuring pupil dilation may not be appropri-
ate methodologically for this question, since an agent’s 
struggle to achieve her goal in a mundane situation may 
not be sufficiently arousing to elicit a change in pupil dila-
tion. And, again, as we noted above in discussing Hepach 
et  al.’ (2016) study, the infants may experience the activ-
ity as a joint action (including the third party) even when 
they themselves do not have to make a contribution at the 
moment because the third party does so.
The joint action preference model also generates a 
slightly different prediction, namely that infants will help 
irrespective of the benefit to the helpee. For example, if 
infants were just as likely to help an agent to achieve a goal 
which was detrimental to her well-being, this would be 
difficult to explain as altruism, but would be unsurprising 
from the perspective of the joint action preference model. 
We know of no research testing this directly.
2.3  Aversion to Others’ Distress
A further motivation for prosocial behavior is that seeing 
others nervous or upset (e.g. about not achieving a goal) 
can be aversive. It may, for example, make infants and 
young children nervous or upset, possibly because they fear 
negative consequences for themselves. To the extent that 
this is the case, it may provide a motivation to contribute 
to others’ goals in order to avoid being confronted with oth-
ers’ distress.
The aversion to others’ distress model has prima facie 
plausibility in light of Hoffman’s (1975) influential stage 
theory, which posits that infants are capable of empathic 
distress in the first year of life but do not experience 
empathic concern until the second year. On the other hand, 
some studies designed to test Hoffman’s theory have not 
corroborated the predictions that it generates. For exam-
ple, Hay et al. (1981) reported that 6-month-olds tended to 
orient toward a peer who was expressing distress; i.e. they 
did not seem to be confused as to who was in distress or to 
focus on their own state of distress. Similarly, Roth-Hana-
nia et al. (2011) observed signs of affective and cognitive 
empathy by 8-10-months (for a review and discussion, see 
Davidov et al. 2013).
In view of these findings, the aversion to others’ distress 
model seems unlikely to fully explain the instrumental 
helping data. Of course, this does not rule out the 
possibility that it may identify one factor among others that 
can motivate infants’ instrumental helping behavior. To 
explore this, one possibility would be to investigate whether 
young children would be contented to simply occlude their 
view of the agent in distress, or to exit from the scene.2
2.4  Reputation Management
As adults, we sometimes calculate the likely consequences 
of our actions on our reputations. If infants are to some 
extent motivated by similar concerns, this could provide 
an explanation of their instrumental helping behavior. As it 
happens, current research suggests that it is not until some-
what later in childhood (i.e. around 5) that children adapt 
their actions to manage their reputations. Specifically, 
Engelmann et al. (2012, 2013) have shown that 5-year-olds 
share more and steal less when observed by a peer than 
when alone.
To test the model directly, it would be important to 
investigate how kids behave in situations in which they are 
not being observed. The reputation management model 
should predict that they would be less likely to help when 
they do not believe that they are being observed. As it hap-
pens, there are some findings that bear upon this prediction. 
For example, the study by Hepach et al. mentioned above 
(2016) provides evidence that 18 month-olds are equally 
likely to help in a scenario in which the agent is absent and 
does not know about the help being offered.
While these findings indicate that reputation manage-
ment is unlikely to provide an exhaustive explanation of 
the motivation underlying instrumental helping in infancy, 
it is of course still possible that infants may be responsive 
to cues which are relevant to reputation management, even 
if they are not representing or reasoning about reputation 
per se. In other words, some more proximal mechanisms 
underpinning reputation management may play a role. 
This conjecture is motivated by the results of Rochat et al. 
(2012), who administered a mirror self-recognition task 
designed to test the hypothesis that young children inter-
pret their mirror image in reference to how others might 
perceive and evaluate them. To this end, they included a 
‘Norm Condition’ in which the child, the experimenter and 
a parent were all marked prior to the mirror exposure. They 
found that children as young as 18 months old tended either 
to leave the mark on in the Norm Condition or at least to 
hesitate, indicating that they were aware of their self-image 
and acted to conform to the norms of their group.
With respect to instrumental helping, one possibility is 
that infants may be responding to the expectations which 
2 This suggestion is based upon a paradigm used with adults by Bat-
son et al. (1987).
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they take others to have of them: The infants may infer that 
they are expected to help and have a default preference to 
fulfill expectations that they take others to have of them. In 
many of the scenarios used in instrumental helping studies, 
the agent performs an action that is not only highly unlikely 
to lead to their apparent goals but also highly inefficient. 
For example, the experimenter in Warneken and Toma-
sello’s seminal (2006) study walks towards a closed cabi-
net with an armload of books. It would be rational for the 
infants scenarios like this to infer that the experimenter is 
expecting them to help. This interpretation would be sup-
ported if it could be shown that making the other agent’s 
expectation more salient increased the helping behavior 
(e.g., if the agent announced to some third party that she 
expected the participant to help, or if she made eye contact 
with the participant).
There are some findings in the literature which sit awk-
wardly with the conjecture that infants’ instrumental help-
ing behavior may constitute a response to expectations. 
First, Warneken (2013) found that 2 year-olds helped just 
as much in the absence of parental presence an encourage-
ment—although the significance of this result should be 
qualified in light of Dahl’s (2015) finding, discussed above, 
that encouragement and praise in helping situations at home 
may instill a belief in the children that they are expected to 
help. The next awkward finding is due to Warneken, who 
in a recent study (Warneken 2013) reported that 2 year-
olds were just as likely to help when the helpee was not 
yet aware of the accident necessitating the help, and thus 
did not expect any help. This, like the Hepach et al. (2016) 
report of anonymous helping discussed above, are not 
immediately reconcilable with the present conjecture about 
expectation. In both of these cases, though, the infant may 
anticipate that s/he will be expected to help in a moment 
when the agent notices the accident/returns to the scene, 
and be proactively sensitive to this expectation. Moreover, 
the point about Dahl’s (2015) findings also applies here: 
the infants may already have learned that they are expected 
to help in such situations.
2.5  Compulsive Planning
A further model, which to our knowledge has not yet been 
discussed in the literature, takes its starting point from 
the observation that humans are also highly proficient 
at representing the instrumental structure of action—i.e. 
at constructing plans and flexibly adapting them during 
the course of actions (including joint actions) (Silk 2009; 
Tomasello 2009). Infants and young children, though, do 
not yet exhibit this characteristic human. This point is illus-
trated by a recent study by Beck et al. (2011). They found 
that 5-year-old children were not proficient at innovating 
tools in scenarios that were in fact quite similar to contexts 
in which some non-human animals, particularly corvids, 
perform well (Weir et al. 2002; Bird and Emery 2009). We 
believe that these findings underscore the point that chil-
dren must acquire a proficiency for reasoning flexibly about 
the instrumental structure of actions—given that such a 
proficiency is clearly highly characteristic of adult humans. 
So, when an infant or young child observes an agent per-
forming an action and identifies the goal of the action (e.g. 
putting the books in the shelf), she may have a tendency 
to spontaneously engage in practice planning, i.e. to calcu-
late the most efficient way of achieving the goal. In many 
cases the most efficient plan involves a contribution X from 
a second agent (for example opening the cabinet door). In 
sum, the identification of the goal leads the child to repre-
sent X (what she would need to do to contribute to bring-
ing about the goal). Of course, this conjecture does not yet 
provide an explanation of why the infant would then act to 
carry out such a plan once she has constructed it, but there 
are ways of addressing this challenge.
One possibility, for example, is to speculate that if the 
infant works out an efficient plan for bringing about the 
goal, it could be unsatisfying for her to see the goal pur-
sued in a less efficient manner. In other words, children 
(and perhaps people in general) have a preference for 
things to be done in the most efficient way possible. As a 
source of preliminary support to motivate this conjecture, 
one might reflect that it can indeed be irritating to see peo-
ple performing actions incompetently -- often one feels an 
urge to correct them and make them do it right. To probe 
the conjecture experimentally, it could be fruitful to inves-
tigate whether children would be content to contribute to 
a suboptimal strategy. Studies with children as young as 
2 reveal a tendency to correct others who do not perform 
actions in a manner that conflicts with relevant norms, i.e. 
not in accordance with the rules of a game (Rakoczy et al. 
2008; Rakoczy and Schmidt 2013). Of course, failing to 
perform actions according to rules is different from failing 
to perform actions in an efficient manner, but these results 
at least do indicate that children are in some cases prepared 
to correct other agents who do not perform an action in 
the way the child believes they should. Perhaps the meth-
ods employed in these studies may therefore be extended to 
investigate whether children at this age would also be moti-
vated to correct others who perform actions inefficiently 
and/or whether children may be less willing to contribute to 
inefficient action plans.
A further option for addressing the challenge would be 
to speculate that performing the actions in these scenarios 
may provide the infants with an opportunity for active 
learning, i.e. to test out the plan and learn from the conse-
quences3 (cf. Schulz 2015)). This could be in principle 
3 We are grateful to Sam Clarke for this suggestion.
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tested by manipulating the degree to which the goal and 
actions are familiar to the infant. More familiar goals and 
actions (perhaps due to a longer familiarization phase) 
should, on this model, elicit less helping behavior.
2.6  Goal Alignment
A further class of models, which Paulus (2014) has dubbed 
‘goal-alignment models’, are based on the core idea that the 
identification of an agent’s goal leads infants to take up that 
goal as their own. This may occur because of the lack of 
self–other differentiation in young infants (cf. Barresi and 
Moore 1996)—i.e. having identified the goal, the infant 
lacks the resources to quarantine it from her own endog-
enous goals and simply treats it like any other goal that she 
has. As a result, she is motivated to perform the action just 
as she would be if the goal had arisen endogenously. In this 
subsection, we briefly present two different versions of this 
basic idea.
2.6.1  Goal Contagion
One way of thinking about goal contagion is in terms of 
behavioral mimicry at a relatively abstract level, i.e. not 
imitating the agent’s specific movements but being primed 
to perform an action with the same goal: ‘The represen-
tation of the observed goal may have primed behaviour 
resulting in that goal’ (Kenward and Gredebäck 2013). To 
motivate this conjecture, Kenward and Gredebäck refer 
to research showing that adults are motivated to perform 
actions with similar goals to the agents in vignettes they 
have read. In particular, Aarts et  al. (2004) exposed par-
ticipants to brief vignettes in which an agent appeared to be 
motivated to achieve a certain goal, such as making money, 
and then measured participants’ motivation to pursue a 
similar goal, such as making money. They found that par-
ticipants were indeed primed to exert more effort in pursuit 
of similar goals (making money in the experiment).
2.6.2  Goal Slippage
Michael et  al. (2016) have recently proposed an alter-
native explanation of young children’s spontaneous 
helping behavior: when the child identifies the goal G 
of the agent’s action (e.g. putting a stack of books into 
the cabinet), this causes the child to form the goal G, 
i.e. it elicits a motivation to complete the action and to 
achieve the goal. ‘Goal slippage’, as they term this pro-
cess, may occur as a consequence of the way in which 
goals are represented at the most basic level, namely in 
an agent-neutral manner—i.e. as outcomes that are to 
be brought about, irrespective of who desires them or is 
who is attempting to bring them about. In other words, 
the identification of a goal as a goal has the effect that the 
goal slips from perception into action, and the child treats 
it as her or his own goal.
These two models are clearly quite similar insofar as 
they both seek to explain infants’ motivation to help in 
instrumental helping paradigms as being of the same kind 
as their motivation to act upon endogenously generated 
goals. This is because both goal alignment models entail 
that the infants simply take up the goal as their own4. 
But, as we shall see in the next section, there is also an 
important difference in how these two goal alignment 
models specify the content of the goal that the infant 
identifies and takes up.
3  Whose Goal?
3.1  Rich Goals and Lean Goals
While the concept of a goal is fundamental in psychol-
ogy and elsewhere, there is surprisingly little consen-
sus about how to define it. At a bare minimum, a goal 
is an outcome of an agent’s movements. But clearly this 
is not enough to distinguish goals from incidental con-
sequences of movements. For example, stepping on and 
killing a bug may be a consequence of walking across the 
room, whereas the goal may be to place some books in 
the cabinet. Intuitively, an outcome of an action is only 
a goal of that action if the action is performed because it 
is likely to bring about that outcome. There are various 
ways of articulating this idea. In particular, they differ 
with respect to whether or not they appeal to the men-
tal representations of the agent carrying out the action. 
Butterfill and Apperly (2013), for example, offer a lean 
4 It is worth noting that there is a way a third model goal alignment 
model, based upon affective contagion. Kärtner et al. (2010) hypoth-
esize that in situations where an agent is distressed (e.g. when a doll’s 
arm breaks), the infant will be infected with the agent’s distress via 
affective contagion, and that the agent’s object-directed behavior (e.g. 
toward the doll’s broken arm) will indicate a cause of the distress. As 
they put it: ‘the toddlers acquired a situation-specific understanding 
(“sad because of the broken teddy”) although “sad” was not under-
stood as the mental state of the other person. This experience-bound 
understanding allows toddlers to help the distressed other. Thus, we 
propose that situational helping behavior is an alternative to empathi-
cally motivated helping behavior in emotion-laden situations with a 
needy or distressed other’ (912). Kärnter et  al. (2010)’s study does 
not relate directly to instrumental helping, since the agent was not 
distressed because of her failure to achieve a goal, and the infants’ 
accordingly tended to comfort the agent rather than instrumentally 
helping her. For this reason, we will not consider it further here. It 
would be worthwhile for further research to probe how the affective 
contagion model could be applied to instrumental helping, and how it 
would relate to goal contagion and goal slippage.
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characterization of goals which avoids making appeal to 
the mental representations of the agent. They write:
We stipulate that for an outcome, g, to be the goal 
of some bodily movements is for these bodily move-
ments to occur in order to bring about g; that is, g 
is the function of this collection. Here “function” 
should be understood teleologically. On the simplest 
teleological construal of function, for an action to 
have the function of bringing about g would be for 
actions of this type to have brought about g in the 
past and for this action to occur in part because 
of this fact. The virtue of this way of represent-
ing goals is that it allows them to be inferred from 
actions without appealing to intentions, beliefs, 
preferences or other psychological states. (Butterfill 
and Apperly 2013, p. 613).
This characterization (by design) eschews mentalistic 
talk of what an agent intends or desires to bring about, 
or is trying to bring about, or of what outcome the agent 
represents. Instead, it distinguishes the goal of an action 
from other outcomes of the action by appealing to the 
notion of a function (understood teleologically, cf. Mil-
likan 1984): the action is performed because on previ-
ous occasions performing the action led to the outcome. 
This characterization has the virtue of simplicity, and the 
absence of mentalistic language may well make it easier 
to operationalize.
On the other hand, it may be problematic in cases in 
which an action is performed for the first time, or where 
it is likely to lead to a different outcome than it has in 
the past. Moreover, the very same movements can func-
tion to bring about different outcomes in different situ-
ations, depending on features of the context, including 
various mental states of the observed agent (Jacob and 
Jeannerod 2005; Michael and Christensen 2016). In order 
to address such cases, it may be useful to appeal to inten-
tions, desires, trying or other mental representations that 
guide the action (Huang and Bargh 2014; Aarts and Dijk-
sterhuis 2000). On such a richer view, an outcome of an 
action counts as a goal if the agent’s actions are guided 
by a representation of that outcome. A representation of 
a particular outcome may, for example, make it possible 
to modify the action in light of feedback or of changing 
circumstances such as to increase the likelihood of effi-
ciently bringing about the outcome.
With this distinction in hand, let us now return to our 
two goal alignment models. As well shall see, it is natu-
ral to think of goal slippage in terms of the lean notion 
of goals, to think of goal contagion in terms of the rich 
notion of goals. We will then use this distinction as a 
wedge to tease apart these models.
3.2  Rich Goals and Goal Contagion
To see how Kenward and Gredebäck (2013) think about 
the notion of goals and in particular the relation between 
the agent and the goal within the content of the goal repre-
sentation that infants identify in spontaneous helping para-
digms, let us take a closer look at how they interpret the 
results of their instrumental helping study. They observed 
that infants lifted agent-like geometrical forms over a bar-
rier and thereby helped them to reach their apparent goal 
of getting to the other side (Kenward and Gredebäck 2013). 
Tellingly, they interpret this as evidence against the goal 
priming model:
‘One result, however, speaks against the goal-priming 
account. If goal-priming led to imitation of a non-
human agent’s actions by infants, re-enactment of the 
agent’s original actions would be expected, at least 
in the control condition where there was no obvious 
incomplete action. Such re-enactment was observed 
only at very low frequencies, suggesting that goal- 
priming may not have been a strong motivator of the 
infants’ actions’ (e75130).
What they seem to have in mind is that priming should 
lead an infant to take up the goal of getting to the other 
side of the barrier (i.e. for themselves) – not the goal that 
the geometrical forms get to the other side. And indeed 
this is consistent with the aforementioned study by Aarts 
et  al., (2004), in which participants were primed to take 
up the same goals (making money, attaining causal sex) 
as the protagonists of the vignettes with which they were 
presented: the participants were of course not motivated to 
make money for arrange causal sex for the protagonist in 
the vignette but for themselves.
It is apparent that the model is based upon the rich char-
acterization of goals as representations of outcomes which 
guide an agent’s actions, is to think of it as a form of prim-
ing. When an observer (an infant for example) perceives an 
agent (an experimenter for example) performing an action 
directed toward a particular outcome, she identifies the goal 
in the sense of a mental representation guiding the action. 
This mental representation then exercises the same func-
tional role that it plays in the observed agent, and functions 
to guide the observer’s actions to bringing about the out-
come. In other words, identifying the experimenter’s goal 
as a mental representation of a state of affairs that is to be 
brought about (e.g. putting the books into the cabinet) has 
the effect that the child observer will come to have this very 
same goal in the sense of a mental representation guiding 
her action, and will accordingly experience a tension until 
the state of affairs is achieved and will organize her actions 
in such a way as to bring about the state of affairs.
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This is consistent with the ‘selfish-goals’ proposal 
offered by Huang and Bargh (2014), who argue that goals 
are autonomous in the sense that they organize an agent’s 
thought and behavior such as to ensure that the represented 
outcome is brought about, and do so irrespective of whether 
that outcome is consistent with other goals (or interests) 
that the agent might have, and irrespective of whether the 
agent is aware of their working. They write:
‘Priming (passively and temporarily activating) an 
individual’s internal goal representation affects sub-
sequent judgments and behaviors in a manner consist-
ent with him or her being in a motivated state (Bargh 
et al. 2001, 2008).’
and:
‘Research suggests that people who are unaware that 
they are pursuing a goal respond to the world in a 
way that maximizes the likelihood of goal comple-
tion, such as by paying more attention to objects in 
the environment that would assist with goal pursuit 
and becoming predisposed to like and physically 
approach those objects. Goals operate autonomously 
(i.e., independent of guidance from the conscious 
individual) through these mechanisms to encourage 
achievement of their associated end-states’ (Huang 
and Bargh 2014, p. 123).
In applying the goal contagion model to spontaneous 
helping scenarios, then, we appear to arrive at the follow-
ing account:
1. The infant identifies the goal in the rich sense of a 
mental representation guiding the action (‘must get 
pencil’).
2. This mental representation then exercises the same 
functional role that it plays in the observed agent, and 
functions to guide the infant’s actions such as to bring 
about the outcome (i.e. to get the pencil).
3. This may lead the infant to get the pencil for herself.
For some actions, such as putting the books on the shelf, 
this will make no difference, but for some other ones, such 
as getting the pencil, it will. In other words, this model gen-
erates the empirically false prediction that the child will 
take up the goal of getting the pencil (for herself) rather 
than the goal of getting the experimenter the pencil.
3.3  Lean Goals and Goal Slippage
To avoid this consequence, we propose to consider how a 
goal slippage model may be articulated on the basis of the 
lean notion of goals. One way of doing so would be to draw 
upon the so-called ‘common-coding approach’, developed 
most prominently by Wolfgang Prinz (1997; cf. also Hom-
mel et al. 2001; James 1890). Common coding provides a 
framework within which to understand goal slippage on the 
basis of a thin characterization of goals. According to this 
common coding, perceptible events, such as a glass being 
filled with water, are represented in the same format as 
actions (such as the action of filling the glass with water). 
As a consequence of this overlap in the representational 
formats of action and perception, the representation of an 
event activates the very same representations that would 
cause the motor system to initiate an action that would 
bring about that event. Thus, observing (or imagining) a 
glass being filled with water activates a motor program for 
filling the glass with water (see Hommel et al. 2001 for a 
review of evidence in support of the theory).
If this is correct, then the observation of an action may 
lead the observer (i.e. the infant in a spontaneous helping 
scenario) to identify the event that is the goal (i.e. putting 
the books in the cabinet), and as a result of activating this 
representation to initiate an action that will bring about this 
outcome.
The explanation that this provides of why an observer 
who identifies the outcome toward which an agent’s move-
ments are directed is motivated to perform an action 
directed toward bringing about that outcome does not 
appeal to the representations of the observed agent. This 
is an advantage. To see why, consider the example of the 
experimenter trying to grasp a pencil that is just beyond 
her reach. If the goal which the infant identifies in this case 
were characterized as a mental representation guiding the 
agent’s action (i.e. in the rich sense of a goal), then she 
should take up a goal with the content (‘get the pencil’), 
leading her to get the pencil for herself rather than for the 
experimenter. Instead, however, we arrive at the following 
account:
1. The infant observes an agent performing an action 
directed toward a particular outcome
2. The infant identifies the goal in the lean sense of an 
outcome (event) toward which the agent’s movements 
are directed (i.e. the agent getting the pencil in her 
hand).
3. The representation of this possible outcome (event) 
activates the very same representations in the infant 
that would cause the motor system to initiate an action 
to bring about that event.
4. The infant initiates that action and brings it about that 
the agent winds up with the pencil in her hand.
In other words, by starting out from the lean notion of 
goals, the goal slippage model avoids the empirically false 
prediction generated by the goal contagion model and suc-
cessfully explains a wide range of findings. It entails that 
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once a goal is identified, the infant identifying the goal 
should become motivated to achieve the goal because s/he 
will treat it just like any other goal that s/he has. This expla-
nation eliminates the need to postulate any further motiva-
tional mechanism apart from those which move infants to 
act on endogenously arising goals.
As such, it generates a pattern of predictions that sets it 
apart from the models discussed above. Like the psycholog-
ical altruism model, it predicts that rewards are not neces-
sary for, and may even interfere with, instrumental helping. 
Unlike the psychological altruism model (but like the joint 
action preference model), it predicts that an infant would 
continue helping (or even protesting) if an agent were to 
become distracted, lose interest or otherwise abandon the 
goal. Unlike the joint action preference model, it predicts 
that infants will want to complete goals even if this does 
not involve joint action. Unlike the reputation management 
model, it correctly predicts anonymous helping (Hepach 
et al. 2017). Unlike the aversion to others’ distress model, it 
does not generate the prediction that infants will look away 
to avoid being confronted with the agent in distress. Unlike 
the compulsive planning model, it does not predict that 
familiar actions should elicit less helping behavior.
There are however some problems with the goal slip-
page model as sketched here. One of them arises from the 
lean characterization of goals. As noted above, the very 
same movements can function to bring about different out-
comes on different occasions, depending on many features 
of the context, including the mental states of the observed 
agent (Jacob and Jeannerod 2005; Michael and Christensen 
2016). How, then, does the infant determine which possible 
outcome is the one toward which the agent’s movements 
are directed? For example, how does an infant identify that 
the agent’s goal is to put the books into the cupboard? One 
way in which this problem could in principle be solved 
would be to identify the goal as the outcome that one has 
most frequently observed as an end state of the type of 
movement that one is currently observing5. If the infants in 
instrumental helping scenarios rely on something like this, 
then it should be possible to influence infants’ helping 
behavior by manipulating the frequency with which par-
ticular types of movements are paired with particular goals 
in a familiarization phase.
A second problem arises from the appeal made here to 
common coding as a means of articulating goal slippage. 
There are often many different motor possibilities for bring-
ing about an outcome (grasping the pencil with the right or 
5 In order to evaluate this conjecture, it would be necessary to spell 
out how goals and movements types are individuated, and in particu-
lar at what fineness of grain they are represented in computing the 
frequency of movement-goal pairs.
the left hand; grasping it towards the end or in the middle; 
holding it up and letting the other agent reach out to take 
it or extending the arm to place it in their hand). Select-
ing one action plan will likely to depend on various con-
textual details (Is one’s right hand already occupied? How 
is the pencil currently situated? How far away and how tall 
is the other agent?), so it is difficult to see how one action 
plan could be uniquely linked to the outcome, and therefore 
which motor command would be elicited by the anticipa-
tion of the outcome.
Third, this account does not provide an explanation that 
specifically addresses the motivation to perform actions 
leading to outcomes that are the goals of other agents. It 
provides a general explanation of why, whenever an agent 
represents any event that she could possibly bring about 
through an action in her repertoire, this should trigger an 
impulse to perform the action and to bring about the event.
Fourthly, and relatedly, it appears to predict that people 
will be motivated to perform actions to bring about any 
event at all that they are led to imagine, as long as it is one 
that they could bring about through an action of their own. 
This is too broad. After all, one thinks of possible events all 
the time without then bringing them about. Indeed, some-
times one thinks of events in order to prevent them. The 
goal slippage model therefore needs to build in a mecha-
nism for inhibiting actions in a great many cases. If this is 
correct, then it should be possible to selectively interfere 
with the inhibiting mechanism and thereby increase spon-
taneous helping behavior. One way to test this prediction 
would be to increase cognitive load through the introduc-
tion of a secondary task: spontaneous helping behavior 
should be less likely to occur when executive resources are 
occupied (e.g. under cognitive load). Unfortunately, such 
an approach would probably not be suitable for an experi-
ment with very young children. However, if some version 
of the goal alignment account is right, then it should be 
possible to increase helping behavior in adults through the 
imposition of cognitive load. In order to implement such 
a test, it would be useful to develop an instrumental help-
ing paradigm that could—like the secondary task—be per-
formed while seated at a computer.
4  Conclusions
We have compared and contrasted several distinct models 
of the psychological mechanisms underpinning spontane-
ous instrumental helping in infancy. We have aimed to illu-
minate the motivations for considering these models, and 
also the theoretical commitments and empirical predictions 
that they generate. In some cases, this has led us to formu-
late theoretical objections and to point out where empirical 
findings are not consistent with the predictions generated 
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by a model. We do not believe that any of these objections 
or predictive shortcomings are decisive; our aim in discuss-
ing them has been to indicate how further research may 
evaluate them and/or to revise them.
Both of the goal alignment models that we have dis-
cussed, namely goal contagion and goal slippage, have in 
common that once a goal is identified, the observer iden-
tifying the goal should become motivated to achieve it 
because s/he will treat it just like any other goal that s/he 
has. Thus, in contrast to the models discussed in Sect.  2, 
these models do not postulate any further motivational 
mechanism apart from those which move infants to act on 
endogenously arising goals. This may make them suitable 
for explaining some cognitively undemanding forms of 
prosocial behavior (i.e. which may qualify as altruistic in 
the evolutionary sense but not the psychological sense). The 
goal slippage model has the further attractive feature that it, 
in contrast to the goal contagion model, does not generate 
the empirically false prediction that observers (i.e. infants 
in instrumental helping scenarios) will wind up competing 
with the agents whose goals they take up. Instead, it gener-
ates a unique pattern of predictions that sets it apart from 
the other models, and which may provide a fruitful impulse 
for further research investigating the ontogeny of the psy-
chological underpinnings of human cooperation.
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